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A SET OF INDEPENDENT NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR SIMPLE MAJORITY DECISION'
BY KENNETH 0. MAY THE PROBLEM of the relation between group choice and individual preferences has been stated by Kenneth J. Arrow in terms of a "social welfare function" that gives group choice as a function of the preferences of the individuals making up the group.2 One of the conditions that he puts on this function is that group choice concerning a set of alternatives must depend only upon individual preferences concerning the alternatives in that set.' In particular, group choice in the presence of just two alternatives depends only upon individual preferences with respect to this pair of alternatives. Since it follows that the pattern of group choice may be built up if we know the group preference for each pair of alternatives, the problem reduces to the case of two alternatives. We shall be concerned with the method of choice by simple majority vote, in order both to elucidate the nature of this familiar institution and to throw further light on Arrow's interesting results. We assume n individuals and two alternatives x and y. Symbolizing "the ith individual prefers x to y" by xP y and "the ith individual is indifferent to x and y" by xliy, we assume that for each i one and only one of the following holds: yPix, yi x, or xPi y. With each individual we associate a variable Di that takes the values -1, 0, 1 respectively for each of these situations. Similarly, for the group, we write D = -1 ,O 1 according as yPx, ylx, or xPy, i.e., according as the group decision is in favor of y, indifference, or in favor of x.
The function in which we are interested is of the form We might describe this condition by saying that the method must be decisive and universally applicable, or more briefly always decisive, since it must specify a unique decision (even if this decision is to be indifferent) for any individual preferences.
The second condition is that each individual be treated the same as far as his influence on the outcome is concerned. This means that in f(D1, D2, ---, Dn) we could interchange any two of the variables without changing the result. 
